The South African demographic statistics echo the global trend of an ageing population. This fact poses challenges to the country's labour supply, to health care, retirement and intergenerational relations. The elderly are faced with specific challenges such as negative views regarding older people, discrimination and prejudice based on age, changing roles, the loss of a support system when children emigrate, financial problems, abuse and neglect, emotions of fear and depression, and the struggle to find meaning in life and suffering. The (...) field of study that concerns ageing and older adulthood is called gerontology. Joan Erber defines it as 'the study of the biological, behavioural, and social phenomena that occur from the point of maturity to old age.' It is an interdisciplinary field where different disciplines seek to address the problems associated with ageing. Biologists focus on the biological processes of ageing, psychologists focus on aspects like mental abilities, personality and behaviour, whilst sociologists study the social roles, group behaviour and status of older people. The question may be asked what is being done regarding the spiritual and emotional needs of the elderly. This is the niche of practical theology, as indicated by one definition of practical theology that it is 'a place where religious belief, tradition and practice meet contemporary experiences, questions and actions and conducts a dialogue that is mutually enriching, intellectually critical, and practically transforming' according to Pattison and Woodward. The aims of this exploratory article are (1) to investigate to what extent research in practical theology has addressed the spiritual and emotional needs of the elderly and (2) to identify opportunities where practical theology may provide service in the field of gerontology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MEANING IN A '.REALIST PERSPECTivE STEPHEN THERON National University of Lesotho Lesotho I DISCUSSION OF meaning and ref,erring in the terms laid down in a classic article of Frege's has generated a stereotyped attitude to the question in the minds of many. It is simply assumed that meaning is, as it were, the contrary of reference. In logic this is 11eflected by the assumed pamdigm of there being (...) formal systems which al'e.called purely formal to the extent that they are ' uninterpreted ', i.e. ·divol'ced from all questions of reference.1 If as a matter of history we accept that modern logic has grown basically out of Kantian soil, then it should not surprise that it is generally linked with a form of apriorism. The violence of the movement against ' psychologism ' shows how strong the danger is of linking the necessities of logic with those supposed epistemic necessities the non-Kantian realist can only regard as spurious. Anyhow this paper will be less·directly about logic than about those supposed necessities. I mean such constraints as Jonathan Bennett calls in general the " veil of perception " 2, ·as if perceiving, which should be an un- :veiling or bringing to lighrt, at the same time obscures what is seen or thought. The same idea recurs in the recent theory of 1 Of. Henry Veateh, Intentional Logic (Yale, 1952): In trying to subsume ordinary intentional relations like that of subject. predicate under the more abstract forms of a completely uninterpreted relational pattern... treated simply as a one-term relation on a par with all the... n-term real relations •. • mathematical logicians have in effect changed the character of such intentional relations completely.... (pp. 7778 ) :i See J. L. Mackie's Problems from Locke. ~9 30 STEPHEN THERON 'internal realism', just a more confusing name for transcendental idealism so far as I can see. There is of course no sense to the idea of checking what we claim to know against what we do not yet know. Yet he:re we should not be discussing precisely truth but the quite separate ontological question whether " THE WORLD is independent of any particular representrution we have of it" (Putnam's notion of the 'metaphysical realism' he rejects), whether "reality is altogether independent of experience," as Michael Devitt argues.3 This is a question of the being of the world, which existed before I d1d. Even as concerns the present moment, the wor1d is such that I or you might not exist, and this contingency of cognitive beings, severally or generally, to the actual world, as a possibility inherent in it, may not without more ado be identified with the quite different possibility of another world, like to this e.x:cept for the absence of me or you. For the former is a real if passive possibility in a thing, viz., the world, the latter is merely an alternative conception or idea of a different and merely possible thing. The concept of my dog with a broken leg is a different concept from that of my dog as healthy, but it is of the same dog, and that is why I don't want him to break his 1eg. The world without me was and would be the same world, though differently conceived. This is the basic requirement of realism, which philosophers have often violated, confusing the metaphysical with the epistemological, the real with the certain. For example Descartes reasoned fallaciously from his being certain, as he thought, of the soul's but not of the body's existence to the ontological separateness of these two. Kant, again, seemed to reason from duty as a pure concept or epistemic entity to the real separwteness, as a positivie value, of the motive of duty from any motive of pleasure or aspiration to happiness. Yet it is possible, indeed probable, that in reality soul and body, a M. Devitt," Realism and the Renegade Putnam," Nous 1983, p. 297. MEANING IN A REALIST PERSPECTIVE 31 though distinguishable, do not have separate acts of existence,,and, in any human existence, that the motive of duty both cannot and ought not to be separated from the distinguishable... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR THE TRUTH OF MORAL AND OTHER JUDGMENTS STEPHEN THERON Na,tional University of Lesotho Lesotho, Africa, SIMPSON'S RECENT review of Morals as Founded on Natural Law 1 so misrepresents its main point, one so vital to civilization's continuance, that I feel obliged to try to restate that point. It was of course disconcerting that he misunderstood the main point of the hook (whetlrer he agrees (...) with it or not), thoogh it may,weN. be, as he says, that the book oouM have been mOire readably written. He summarizes the book's aim as being" to establish morality on an external authoritative law "-a summary which does indeed seem close, even :identicaJ., to what is said in the book's first paragraph. However, there is ra potential equivocation in the w;ay he uses " externail.'' One should ask, external to what? What.the book speaks of in this opening paragraph is of justifying morality on ra principle " external to states of mind." I use "external" in the sense of that principle's being "independent of them," 'i.e., of meuba1l srtates. So :llar, this is a very open statement. Brut how do I go on to amplify it? Not the way Simpson does. He takes me as equating this principle with " the authoritative law of God," in the sense of "a divine legislative aiuthority " which, he reports me as arguing, " is just somehow an inemdicwblegiven." This " somehow " not only refoses to consider the meta1 Stephen Theron, Mora,ls M Founded on Na,tural Lww, European University Studies (New York: Peter Lang, 1987; 2nd ed. 1988). Reviewed by Peter Simpson in The ThomiBt 53 (1989): 341-342. ~93 294 STEPHEN THERON physical reasoning at the heart of the book's position but even seems to suggest that such reasoning was not evien offered. In fact it is precisely at this point that Simpson goes right off the raiJs as far as representing my view is concerned. H~ claims that this foundation upon divine authority would make morals "dependent on ·divine 1a.w, not, as his title dedares, on natural law." However, my use of " naturrul law " is rthe Thomistic use, which is sufficiently wen known in the debate so as not to be misleading. In the view of St. Thomas (and a whole established school of thought), natural law is indeed, in Simpson's words, "deriviative and secondary," or, in St. Thomas's words, "a reflected divine light.'' 2 Brut in the famous Artiicle 2 of Question 94 of the Prima secundae of the Summa theologica, so exh81ustively discussed in.the rooent literaturie, natural law is declared to be derived from the eternal law and not from divine law in the "external " or positivist •sense clearly intended by Simpson. (A different distinction is used in the Contra gentiles, but throughout my book the above text was referred to, often explicitly). "Divine law," the fourth type of law (eternal law and natural law being the first two types), does indeed refer, in this text, to some kind of positiv;e legisfation on the part of God in the 01d and New Testaments. (But evien here St. Thomas is oarefoil to point out that the law of the New Testament is only analogous to positive law, since it is not written on stone but poured into men's hearts by the Holy Spirit.) If I had been referring to this divine law (in such phrases as " reaISOn is divine and.therefore law ") and not thait eternal law which is one with the divine being, Simpson might have been able to brooket me with those nominalist theologians for whom.2" quasi lumen r.ationis naturalis... nihil aliud sit quam impressio luminis divini in nobis. Unde patet quod lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura." St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica I-II, 91. 2. THE TRUTH OF MORAL JUDGMENTS 295 God might hav:e decreed an opposite morality if he so chose. (Though this, too, would be contrary to St. Thomas's view of such positive divine law, ev;en for the Old Testament; indeed for him even 011dinary "human" positivie law loses the sense... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 841 message may seem, however clearly at odds with the Weltgeist. What Professor Mitchell's position calls for-to the delight I am sure, of Fr. Copleston-is a universal, unified, sanctificatory, and legitimate teacher of the Christian message: a Church which is one, holy, Catholic, and Apostolic. NICHOLAS INGHAM, O.P. Providence College Providence, Rhode Island Morals as Founded on Natural Law. By STEPHEN THERON. European University Studies. New (...) York: Peter Lang, 1987. 218 pp. $32 (cloth). This is a hard book to read, though it need not be. The author assumes a knowledge of other writings that few (apart from himself) are likely to have, and his English is sometimes tortuous in the extreme. A little more polishing of the sentence structure and a little more explanation of references would have made the book immeasurably. more readable. There would still be flaws in it nevertheless, flaws that concern the content of the book and not its form. Theron's aim is to establish morality on an external authoritative law, namely the authoritative law of God. Towards achieving this he devotes the first chapter to criticizing R.M. Hare, since Hare has a theory of autonomy in morals, or a theory where the prescriptiveness of a law or moral norm is self· imposed and not derived from something outside the autonomously choosing individual. Theron's criticism of Hare, apart from the obscurity of several of the references (obscure, that is, unless one already knows Hare's work more or less inside out), rests on distortions or unsympathetic interpretations of what Hare says. To say that, for Hare, " all that is essential to good living is the extrinsic, fortuitous character of its being commended" (p. 31) is to misrepresent Hare's whole point about the mea,ning of good, for which the a.ct of commending is of the essence and cannot be something extrinsic. And to say that, apart from what can be derived from logic, the rest of Hare's theory is "all a matter of who commends the loudest" (ibid..) is so gross a distortion that one can only wonder if Theron has paid any attention at all to what Hare has written about the nature of moral reasoning. As for Theron's own theory, he says that morality is grounded on a divine legislative authority to which, like children with respect to parents, we just ' find ' ourselves bound. But how are we bcmnd, or BOOK REVIEWS what persuades us that we should submit and obey this authority? Theron denies the applicability of this question, since he says that to seek a ground for this authority is to fall into an infinite regress. Yes indeed if authority can only be grounded by appeal to some other authority. But why should this be so? Because 0£ the nature of reason, says Theron, or how do we justify our acceptance 0£ and obedience to reason? Reason itself cannot do this. "... reason only has the authority of law and even truth if God gives it that authority," and "as one cannot appeal to reason to invalidate reason one cannot appeal to it to validate it" (p. 161). For Theron, what is :first for us. is not reason but divine authority, which is just somehow an ineradicable given. This would make morals, to say nothing of philosophy simply, dependent on divine law, not, as his title declares, on natural law. That title is indeed misleading since it is clear that, in Theron's eyes, natural law, or the law of our natural reason, is derivative and secondary, dependent for its lawfulness on the prior recognition of divine law. But all this must be false. Our recognition of divine law and of its binding force presupposes the validity of the workings of our own reason, for only by reason can we have this recognition. But if we could only admit the validity of our own reason after we have recognized the divine and reason's dependence on it, then we really are caught in an infinite regress, for this recognition would itself have to presuppose the prior validity of reason. And so on and so on. What is first for... (shrink)

Today humanity faces radical global climate change, mass species extinctions, and unprecedented transformations to both terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems across the globe. Environmental ethics is an academic subfield of philosophy concerned with normative and evaluative propositions about the world of nature and, perhaps more generally, the moral fabric of relations between human beings and the world we occupy. This Handbook contains 45 newly commissioned essays written by leading experts and emerging voices and represent some of the best and most contemporary (...) thinking in environmental ethics. The chapters range over a broad variety of issues, concepts, and perspectives that are both central to and characteristic of the field, thus providing an authoritative but accessible account of the history, analysis, and prospect of ideas that are essential to contemporary environmental ethics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:René Girard and the Rhetoric of ConsumptionKathleen M. Vandenberg (bio)The work of René Girard, so productively applied in so many different fields—in theology, in anthropology, in literature, to name a few—has yet to be recognized or applied in the field of rhetorical studies. Yet there exists, I argue, a need precisely for Girard's theories as the over 2000 year-old discipline enters the twenty-first century.Girard's theory of mimetic or triangular (...) desire can be used as a model for understanding persuasion, because it is, among other things, an "expression of a basic set of ideas on... the dynamics of the self and human relations" (1996, vii). Girard's concern is with human relationships and, in a sense, with how individuals in these relationships act rhetorically upon themselves and others. Girard's mimetic theory hinges on the dynamics of imitation and explains how individuals relate through both the conscious and the unconscious sharing of behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs in certain situations. These situations are clearly rhetorical, as can be seen by examining the definition of the "rhetorical situation" set forth by Lloyd Bitzer, in his seminal 1968 article, "The Rhetorical Situation." Bitzer proposes three conditions that must be met for a rhetorical situation to exist: an exigency or imperfection marked by urgency; a rhetorical audience or an audience that can act; and constraints, or elements that have the power to constrain the decision and action needed to modify the exigency (7). In mass-mediated modern rhetoric, I argue that the exigencies exist externally (in the culture) and internally, the audience is both others and self, and the constraints are the alienation, mystification, and desire generated by hierarchies. Twentieth-century rhetorical theorist Kenneth Burke advises that "we must often think of rhetoric not in terms of some one particular address, but as a general body of identifications that owe their convincingness much more to trivial repetition and dull daily reënforcement than to exceptional rhetorical skill" (1950, 26). Such is the case with this particular form of rhetoric, which is generated and propagated by mimetic contagion and thus is best more narrowly defined as sociological propaganda, a type of propaganda [End Page 259] theorized by Jacques Ellul in Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes (1975).Ellul, the first to distinguish between political propaganda and sociological propaganda, proposes that the latter encompasses social behaviors "much more vast and less certain" than those of political propaganda (1975, 62). These social behaviors permit the penetration of an ideology in a society, a penetration that is achieved through the active participation of the masses. Sociological propaganda, as Ellul describes it, works from within; it is dependent on the individual's willingness and ability to persuade him- or herself and others. Sociological propaganda, Ellul posits, is created when members of a group behave in such a way as to influence the attitudes, actions, and lifestyles of others; often this behavior is unconscious, unintentional, and spontaneous.In these ways, the rhetoric of sociological propaganda operates in a markedly different fashion than more "traditional" rhetoric, which is largely understood to operate as a unilateral transaction in which an individual orator actively, openly, and orally works to move a relatively passive but physically present audience to act in accordance with the orator's own beliefs through a formally delivered speech. In its reliance on the interaction and cooperation of the many rather than the centrality and dominance of one speaker, in its acceptance of unintentional, spontaneous, and unconscious persuasion, in its dependence on the modern mass media, and in the limitless and nebulous nature of its boundaries in time and space, sociological propaganda constitutes a type of rhetoric heretofore insufficiently addressed by rhetorical studies. Although existing perspectives in rhetorical criticism have certainly addressed some aspects of this rhetoric, sociological propaganda is not easily explained with the terminology of traditional rhetorical criticism or easily approached from traditional rhetorical perspectives.This article asserts that the best way to approach and understand such propaganda is through the perspective of René Girard. Approaching this propaganda from a Girardian perspective permits us to look beyond the symbols of sociological propaganda and analyze our own responsibility in rhetorical... (shrink)

Recently two distinct forms of rule-utilitarianism have been introduced that differ on how to measure the consequences of rules. Brad Hooker advocates fixed-rate rule-utilitarianism, while Michael Ridge advocates variable-rate rule-utilitarianism. I argue that both of these are inferior to a new proposal, optimum-rate rule-utilitarianism. According to optimum-rate rule-utilitarianism, an ideal code is the code whose optimum acceptance level is no lower than that of any alternative code. I then argue that all three forms of rule-utilitarianism fall prey to two fatal (...) problems that leave us without any viable form of rule-utilitarianism. (shrink)

v. 1. Philosophie. Rechtsphilosophie -- v. 2-4. Volkenrecht -- v. 5-6. Rechtsgeschiedenis. Burgerlijk recht. Procesrecht. Octrooirecht. Studie.

Exploring the darkest side of organizations may have a potential to change our previous assumptions about business life. Scholars both in management and organizational research fields have shown interest in the "bright" side of behavioral life and have looked for the ways to create a positive organizational climate and assumed a positive relation between happiness of employees and productivity. These main assumptions of the Human Relations School have dominated the scientific inquiry on organizational behavior. However, "the dark side of organizational (...) life" may have more explanatory power than "the bright side". Hostility, jealousy, envy, rivalry, gossip, problematic personalities, dislike, revenge, and social exclusion are the realities of business life. A manager may devote most of their time to cope with conflicts, deviant behaviors, ambitious individuals, gossips, and dysfunctional rivalry among employees. It is evident that negative events and interactions among employees cost more time and energy for a manager than the positive side of organizational life. This edited collection specifically focuses on these issues and will be of interest to researchers, academics, and advanced students in the fields of management, organizational studies and behavior, sociology, social psychology, and human resource management. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS The Logic of God Incarnate. By THOMAS V. MORRIS. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986. Pp. 220. $19.95. Thomas V. Morris, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, has written a technical yet provocative study on the Incarnation. As a faithful Christian he believes in and desires to defend the traditional Christian doctrine of the Incarnation proclaimed in the New Testament and defined by the (...) early councils of the Church, especially Chalcedon, that is, that Jesus is the One eternal Son existing in two natures. He also holds that, while the truth of the Incarnation is revealed, it must nonetheless stand the test of logic and reason. The Incarnation cannot be illogicaJ or meaningless. " If the church has been guided by God in such matters as the formulation of its creeds, conciliar decrees, and catechisms,.... we would not expect glaring logical flaws in its central doctrinal affirmations" (p. 46). The stated purpose of Morris's study is to defend the traditional doctrine against those who would hold it to be logically incoherent and meaningless. "In the course of thinking about the Incarnation for some years now, I have come to see that a few simple metaphysical distinctions and a solid dose of logical care will suffice to explicate and defend the doctrine against all extant criticisms of a philosophical nature" (p. 9). Morris meticulously analyzes and critiques a number of arguments that oppose the possibility of coherence of the Incarnation by attempting to demonstrate that such arguments are.either false and illogical themselves, or that they do not apply to a true understanding of the Incarnation. Moreover, Morris proposes a novel understanding of the Incarnation which he believes is both logical and intelligible, and which conforms to the Christian tradition. This goal of upholding the intelligibility of the Incarnate leads Morris to a three-fold task. He first of all must refute his chief adversaries, those who would deny the sensibleness of saying God became man in Jesus. Such critics deny the validity of the Incarnation on the ground..'! that it is meaning·less, and the'l'efore impossible to juxtapose the incommensurable. attributes of divinity and humanity, e.g., perfection/imperfection, immutability/corruptibility. They hold that Jesus could not have had both these sets of properties at once (cf. p. 20). Morris refuses to capitulate to such arguments. He nevertheless insists that any solution to the issue which would undermine human logic or which would fail to uphold the Christian's belief is no solution at all (cf. p. 32). 367 368 BOOK REVIEWS Secondly, Morris's task leads him to refute any attempts at a " OneNature " solution, which would "squash" together the human and divine natures in Jesus to form a single nature. Such proposals jeopardize either the integrity of Jesus's divinity (Arianism) or his humanity (Docetism, Monophysitism), inevitably composing a mythical tertium quid (cf. pp. 33-38). Morris presents a clear case against such corruptions of the Incarnation. Thirdly, Morris's task brings him to analyze contemporary kenotic Christology. He thoroughly discusses this approach, for the reason that it is directly involved in the issue at hand, namely, the incompatibility between divine and human properties in Christ. Secondarily, however, Morris's interest in kenoticism reflects his own hope that some variation of the approach might posibly arrive at a Christological solution (cf. p. 92). While he ultimately rejects kenoticism, Morris flirts with the various alternatives, and, as we shall see, his own perception of the Incarnation remains tinged with a kenotic flavor. How then is it possible to predicate of one and the same individual divine and human attributes intelligibly and coherentlyT To use contemporary computer jargon, the question might be phrased: is it possible that God and man can he "incarnation-friendly¥" Morris believes so. Morris first of all sets out to define the terms-divine nature and human nature. He believes part of the incompatibility problem lies in attributing to Jesus's humanity unnecessarily hostile aspects. He distinguishes between being "merely human" and being "fully human"· To be " merely human " is to possess not only those properties that narrowly define one's nature or kind, such as rationality, but... (shrink)

The use of platelet rich plasma as a novel treatment is discussed in the context of a qualitative research study comprising 38 interviews with sports medicine practitioners and other stakeholders working within the English Premier League during the 2013–16 seasons. Analysis of the data produced several overarching themes: conservatism versus experimentalism in medical attitudes; therapy perspectives divergence; conflicting versions of appropriate evidence; subcultures; community beliefs/practices; and negotiation of medical decision-making. The contested evidence base for the efficacy of PRP is presented (...) in the context of a broader professional shift towards evidence based medicine within sports medicine. Many of the participants while accepting this shift are still committed to casuistic practices where clinical judgment is flexible and does not recognize a context-free hierarchy of evidentiary standards to ethically justifiable practice. We also discuss a tendency in the data collected to consider the use of deceptive, placebo-like, practices among the clinician participants that challenge dominant understandings of informed consent in medical ethics. We conclude that the complex relation between evidence and ethics requires greater critical scrutiny for this emerging specialism within the medical community. (shrink)

In Subjects That Matter, Namita Goswami attends to philosophy’s institutional and disciplinary failures to reconcile its identitarian claims to universality and reason with the feminist and postcolonial modes of thinking it traditionally keeps at bay. This essay places Goswami’s critique within a context of “the thought from outside,” which, beginning with Foucault’s reading of Blanchot, continuing through the geopolitics of Dussel’s philosophy of liberation, and prominent in Catherine Malabou’s conceptualization of plasticity, demonstrates how political critiques of philosophical hegemony contain an (...) implicit theorization of “literature.” If “literature” gives voice to the thought from outside, does it in turn “decolonize” philosophy? If so, what itinerary of thought ought to follow the relationship between this literary decolonization of philosophy and its imbrication within the fold of philosophical thought? How to conceptualize the plastic relation between inside and outside, between center and periphery, without subordinating the latter to the hegemony of the former? This essay argues for a coherence between Goswami’s and Malabou’s materialist understandings of difference and a conceptualization of literature as an “outside” to philosophy that operates “excentrically” “inside” philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper we focus on what is referred to as the ‘mineness’ of experience, that is, the intimate familiarity we have with our own thoughts, perceptions, and emotions. Most accounts characterize mineness in terms of an experiential dimension, the first-person givenness of experience, that is subsumed under the notion of minimal self-consciousness or a ‘minimal self’. We argue that this account faces problems and develop an alternative account of mineness in terms of the coherence of experiences with what we (...) label an ‘embodied biography’. Building on a near consensus among consciousness researchers over the function of consciousness as integrating infor- mation, we argue that the phenomenology of mineness consists in the absence of any further thought on top of the experience itself. Finally we argue that this non-phenomenological account of mineness fits well with existing data on pathologies of mineness such as delusions of thought insertion. (shrink)

Для широкого круга читателей (слушателей, аспирантов, преподавателей) интересующихся данной проблемой.

We consider the quantum electrodynamic problem of the velocity of transmission of an excitation from one atom to another, which was posed by Fermi in 1932 and, in an improved version, by Ferretti in 1968. The problem is solved using Heisenberg operators. The transmission velocity is shown to exceed the light velocity. We argue that this acausal result is to be explained by the inadmissibly idealized description of the signal source used by Fermi and Ferretti.